Attempting to steer this "let [it] fly" discussion back on flight path, and return it to the runway, let me add...

a potential Kunming property market Hindenburg disaster will be averted as long as the lifting of hukou requirements won't entail K through 12. Status quo of speculative buying would remain, though slightly dented by the removal of hukou barriers for tertiary education per '19 urbanization plan.

As supply overtakes demand, apartment rents will remain low for the likes of OP.

Upcoming 5-year plan will be a delicate balancing act between cooling or infusion of heat to release air in keeping our metaphorical, non-hydrogen hot-air balloon afloat and moving on intended course. Adjusting its elevation would depend on the direction of wind & airflow (the external factors).

If trade war impasse was to continue for years and China's GDP taking greater hits, we may witness greater release of air in the proverbial property blimp by removing more substantial hukou requirements to curb non-bank lending/mortgage-based speculative buying. One of the weapons to shore up household consumption/savings and state bank warchest to stimulate the economy.

The reason I asked about primary education is because this may be a concern for the majority of rural families (aspiring or established) that move to cities. If their children can't even attend K-12 due to hukou restrictions, collegiate level may be of concern for the minority of them.

“Prior to this reform, I would have been under pressure to buy a property…”

To your point, I believe the central government has been trying, and thus far succeeded in cooling the property market. Mainly to pivot away from a worrisome economic trend. Which is, the nation's dependency on new debt to generate output growth (i.e. credit intensity of growth).

Rising indebtedness and delinquencies are causes for more concern. Perhaps more than meets the eye. Beyond providing urban hukou for ruralites to reduce disparity gap, or simply dafang to prevent real estate bubble pop.

As mentioned earlier, many Chinese home buyers take out mortgages and loans for real estate speculation whatnot. These mortgages account for rising share of household income. For lower-income families, around 40% of income is earmarked to cover these mortgages. Nearly a quarter for the middle-income.

The '19 urbanization plan may be just one of the vehicles to buck this trend.

China’s household consumption’s share of GDP has been slumping at an alarming rate. Unlike household consumption expenditures, over abundance of household assets in real estate may not spur economic growth. White elephant ghost towns of high residential vacancies due to speculations do not generate thriving business activities.

Moreover, household assets in real estate also means less are saved. Declining savings rate reduces capacity for state-run banks to loan infrastructure projects to boost GDP and sell global influence, such as the BRI.

Aforementioned loans from nonbank financial lenders (via apps) are becoming increasingly popular, which also undermines the reach of state-run banks. More Chinese are importing luxury or travelling abroad by borrowing from such online lenders, thus exacerbating rates of household debt to GDP.

Furthermore, given China’s fast-aging population, income growth continually shrink as savings are extracted for retirement. Given less capacity to stock up on U.S Treasury foreign exchange reserves to limit U.S. interest rates, depleted savings translates to a rising Yuan. A big no no from Chinese economists' POV.

The future of China's hegemonic aspirations is at stake. That, imo, is the true pink elephant.

Agree with Chris.

Prices may also depend on landlord's financial situation. Many amateur speculators borrow from major banks, shady financial services online, or 高利贷 to purchase houses. Quite a few on tight incomes struggle to pay off heavy morgage/loan interests. These landlords would let at a lower than market price for speedy 出手 to kick off cash cow. Revenue stream on a quarterly (季) basis, or semiannually. Correct me if I'm wrong, the norm for rent payments in Kunming?

While some others may prefer to rent out high because they're attached to the wallpaper or chandelier.

*Another typo. I meant 200 meters further East of Bailong Lu toward Baiyun Lu from 新迎路, not West.

You mentioned the '19 urbanization plan would shelve hukou requirements for "groups such as university and vocational college graduates."

Does this politburo plan grant admissions to inner-city primary schools for children of non-hukou lessees?

Primary and secondary school levels would be heavier proponents reshaping the housing structure in Kunming, if the case.

*Correction on my previous post. My friend (the lessor) rented out her two bedroom apartment (not 1B) with sizable living room for 1750. Competing lessors also leased similar 两室一厅 for 200 lower. So expect 1B smaller apartments to be less. Hence, 1500 is achievable for OP upon Dec. return. Fingers crossed.

Good points made by herenow.

While inflation naturally crept their nasty heads into 物价 since '15, supply of residential buildings has also gone up at a greater rate than actual demand of occupancy.

This trend increases price competition among landlords to rent out lower, yet slightly above averages of five years ago.

Although city-center rents have increased to ~2500 for 1B apartments，along with rates of apartment-turned-hotels (酒店式公寓) thanks to influx of tourists, the blossoming of new compounds outward around second ring and beyond have added downward pressure to rent prices.

1500 is still possible in these 2nd ring residential areas near MRT for convenient commute. I say this because a friend was recently lucky enough to rent out her fully furnished 一室一厅 apt at 1750 within a few days of listing. That price was relatively higher than those of her competitor renters. Many of whom listed theirs for much lower at the 1500-1600 market price range.

Again, I can't speak for old compounds in OP's particular area of interest.